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Abstract
The quintessence of recent natural science studies is that the 2◦C target can only be
achieved with massive emission reductions in the next few years. The central twist of this
paper is the addition of this limited time to act into a non-perpetual real options frame-
work analysing optimal climate policy under uncertainty. The window-of-opportunity
modelling setup shows that the limited time to act may spark a trend reversal in the
direction of low-carbon alternatives. However, the implementation of a climate policy is
evaded by high uncertainty about possible climate pathways.
Keywords: Climate policy, CO2 scenarios, non-perpetual real options
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1 Introduction
The future dynamics of greenhouse gas emissions, and their implications for global climate
conditions in the future, will be shaped by the way in which policy makers reach decisions
while facing uncertainties in the climate projections. Under the Cancun Accord, countries
recognised that deep cuts in emissions were required, so as to limit the increase in global
temperature below 2◦C throughout the twenty-first century, but the Accord stopped short
of actually delivering a binding worldwide agreement. To reach this target, the EU strives
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990.1 In contrast,
according to the baseline scenario of the International Energy Agency (IEA) global energy
demand and CO2 emissions will more than double by 2050.
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The current climate debate focuses largely on current and future GHG emissions. However,
climate change results from the cumulative build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere
over time. Greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere and contribute to global warming
long after they are emitted. Based on this insight, Meinshausen et al. (2009) identify an
admissible budget for future emissions that is compatible with the 2◦C target. Against the
background of this so-called carbon budget approach, Rogelj et al. (2011) reanalyse a large set
of published emission scenarios from integrated assessment models and conclude that global
greenhouse gas emissions need to be substantially reduced in future years. The urgency to act
is also confirmed by the projections in the 2011 edition of the World Energy Outlook (IEA
(2011)). It is estimated that so many fossil fuelled power stations, energy intensive factories
and poorly insulated buildings will be very likely erected in the next five years that the
permitted emission budget is already used up. If the expansion of high-carbon infrastructure
is not prevented soon, global warming will not be limited to safe levels. Hence, the limited
time to act is a key aspect in every climate policy decision. Against this background, we
investigate the impact of a limited timeframe on optimal climate threshold policies and their
welfare values.
To this end, we develop a non-perpetual real option modelling framework in which there is
limited time to act. Recent theoretical analyses of decisions under uncertainty have high-
lighted the effects of (partial) irreversibility in generating “real options”.3 Real options models
1See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/documentation/roadmap/docs/com_2011_112_en.pdf for more details.
2See IEA (2010). Beyond a critical temperature threshold, accelerating carbon-climate feedback processes
may lead to positively skewed probability distributions for future climate change leading to non-negligible
probabilities for tipping points. Needless to say, modelling tipping point phenomena in real options models
would be an important priority for future research.
3The partial irreversibility assumption implicitly assumes that technologies to extract massive amounts of
CO2 from the atmosphere are only partly operational in the foreseeable future. Despite significant progress
towards conducting test runs and in establishing legal frameworks, significant challenges to carbon capture
and storage (CCS) remain. The first concerns storage. Recent estimates indicate that some 120 Gt of CO2
must be captured and stored globally over the next four decades – an indication of the storage capacities that
need to be explored, characterised, licensed, safely operated and finally closed. The status and availability
of data on CO2 storage vary significantly around the world which is potentially a major constraint to rapid,
widespread CCS deployment. Furthermore, capturing and storing massive volumes of CO2 will only become
a profitable activity on a large scale if there is a globally adopted, verified and sanctioned agreement by which
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provide a representation of optimal stopping problems that is convenient for many purposes.
They have become increasingly popular in climate economics. While the modelling frame-
work of these models is borrowed from financial economics, the underlying concept is the
same as the discrete-time stochastic dynamic programming models familiar to economists.
Policy makers reach decisions by acting with the objective of maximizing the expected value
of some objective function under uncertainty. In these models the interaction of time-varying
uncertainty and irreversibility leads to a range of inaction where policy makers prefer to
“wait and see” rather than undertaking a costly action with uncertain consequences. The
general idea behind perceiving climate policies as option rights is that implementing a cli-
mate policy can be compared, in its nature, with the purchase of a perpetual financial call
option. The investor pays a premium price to get the right to buy an asset for some time
at a predetermined price (exercise price) that is eventually lower than the spot market price
of the asset. Analogous to this, by deciding in favour of a climate policy the decision maker
pays a price that gives her the ‘right’ to mitigate, which reduces climate damage costs in
the future. However, the introduction of a climate policy faces the following three distinctive
obstacles: (1) there is uncertainty about its future payoff; (2) waiting allows policy makers to
gather new information on the uncertain future; and (3) climate policies are at least partially
irreversible. These characteristics are encapsulated in the concept of real options models.4
Aside from reflecting these features, our model captures the limited time to act by restricting
the availability of the options to a certain period which is exogenously given to the policy
maker. The decision maker can only take measures to meet the 2◦C target before the deadline
expires. Afterwards this goal moves out of reach and the economy has to bear higher climate
damage costs. This set-up allows us to ask, whether such a deadline counteracts the adverse
effects of uncertainty and irreversibility. Does the limited time to act framework accelerate
climate policy?
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a basic overview
of cumulative emission trajectories that are conform to the 2◦C target. In Section 3, the
design of the continuous-time modelling set-up is presented. This part of the paper outlines
a new way to model time-limited windows of opportunities. Subsequently, in Section 4 we
illustrate the working of the model through numerical exercises and examine the sensitivity
of the main results with respect to key parameters. The final section draws conclusions and
presents suggestions for further research. Omitted details of some derivations are available
in two technical appendices.
governments commit to binding cuts of CO2. See Keith et al. (2006).
4This strand of literature now constitutes a significant branch of the climate economics literature. A key
advantage of real options models is that they share core assumptions, which makes them easily scalable to
include further details sand distinctive features that are relevant to address new questions at hand. Since
several surveys of the real options literature, such as Bertola (2010), Dixit & Pindyck (1994) and Stokey
(2009), are available, no attempt is made to do a comprehensive survey in this paper. Golub et al. (2011) have
recently provided a non-technical summary of alternative approaches modelling uncertainty in the economics
of climate change.
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2 Admissible Emission Trajectories for the 2◦C Target
A widely supported climate policy goal is to limit global warming throughout the twenty-
first century within the “comfort zone” of 1-2◦C above the pre-industrial temperature. This
restriction is supposed to be sufficiently low to prevent enormous climate damage, which
may be also caused by passing tipping points of the Earth system. In this spirit, Article
2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change demands stabilisation
of greenhouse gas concentrations at a suitable level. However, scientific studies indicate
that achieving this objective would require more than stabilisation because of the very long
lifetime of carbon in the atmosphere and the response time of the temperature. As pointed
out by Archer (2005), half of CO2 emissions are removed by the natural carbon cycle within
a century, but a substantial fraction will stay in the atmosphere for several millennia.5 This
is also beacuse of to positive feedback effects, which probably initiate a net release of CO2
out of the present carbon sinks such as the terrestrial biosphere by the end of the century,
see Cox et al. (2000). Therefore, the present emissions will have an irreversible effect on
human timescales. Beyond this, CO2-attributable global warming processes are rather slow.
For instance, the warming of the ocean lags behind considerably, so that the full effects on
temperature are not yet felt. However, the slow ocean mixing that delays the warming would
be also responsible for a slow cooling. Hence, the benefits of a decrease of atmospheric carbon
concentrations would be widely offset.6
Due to these insights, Allen et al. (2009), Meinshausen et al. (2009) and Zickfeld et al.
(2009) observe that future temperature is remarkably insensitive to the shape of the emission
trajectory and depends only on the cumulative total. Therefore, policy targets that are
linked to the total amount of emissions are likely to be more robust to scientific uncertainty
than those that refer to emission rates or concentration targets. To offer a basis for policy
discussions, Meinshausen et al. (2009) provide explicit numbers that are compatible with the
2◦C objective to a certain probability.7 Having already used up a substantial part of the
global carbon budget in the first 10 years of this century, the remaining cumulative total is
assessed to be 750 Gt for the time period until 2050.8 At this level, the probability of the
global temperature exceeding 2◦C throughout the twenty-first century is calculated to be 33
percent. Beyond this Meinshausen et al. (2009) also point out that the total proven fossil
fuel reserves are large enough to move the 2◦C target out of reach with a probability of 100
percent.
5Being based on climate models of different complexity, other studies support these findings on the whole,
see for example Lenton et al. (2006), Matthews & Caldeira (2008), Mikolajewicz et al. (2007), Montenegro
et al. (2007) or Tyrell et al. (2007).
6More information on this topic is provided by Matthews & Caldeira (2008) and Solomon et al. (2009).
7Zickfeld et al. (2009) present similiar computations for the period 2000-2500.
8Many studies examine solely the effects of CO2 emissions. Being released to the atmosphere at rapidly
growing rates, CO2 presents itself as the most important anthropogenic climate forcing. However, mitigation
of non-CO2 forcings may grant more leeway to the admissible carbon budget. In particular, limiting the black
carbon production would be cost-effective and bear fruits quickly, because this aerosol stays in the atmosphere
for a relatively short life-time, see Allison et al. (2011) and Wallack & Ramanathan (2009).
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What are the design choices when setting an emission reduction timetable? Figure 1 illus-
trates alternative global emission pathways admitting cumulative CO2 emissions of 750 Gt
during the time period 2010 - 2050.9 The global emissions of CO2 decreased slightly between
2008 and 2009 following the worldwide financial and economic crisis. Nevertheless, global
emissions again reached record levels in 2010. Each trajectory merges an initial business as
usual phase with a subsequent mitigation phase that is assumed to be delayed until 2014
(red), 2018 (orange), 2022 (green) and 2025 (blue), respectively. The up-to-date evidence
implies a fast diminishing window of opportunity to stabilize CO2 concentrations at a level of
2◦C. The outcomes also illustrate that the longer the start of the mitigation phase is delayed,
the steeper the subsequent reduction in emissions has to be. More precisely, even two-digit
cuts in annual emissions are required once the short time slot until 2020 remains unused.
This occurs due to the realistic assumption of increasing annual emissions in the business as
usual scenario, so that the total carbon budget tends to be exhausted quickly. Figure 1 also
highlights that we need to shut down CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industrial processes
not later than 2050.
205020402030202020102000
Global CO2 Emissions from  Fossil Fuels and other Industrial Processes (in Gt)
    Maximum Annual Rate of Emissions Reductions     Required After the Peak:             6.2  % per year            8.6  % per year            13.3% per year            30.2% per year
Business as Usual Scenarios:          Peak in 2014 with 36.1 Gt CO2 Emissions          Peak in 2018 with 40.7 Gt CO2 Emissions         Peak in 2022 with 45.9 Gt CO2 Emissions         Peak in 2025 with 50.2 Gt CO2 Emissions
      
      
Figure 1: Alternative Carbon Dioxide Emission Pathways Complying with the 2◦C Target
with a Probability of 67 Percent.
Further studies also indicate that the 2 degree target requires early decreasing, rather than
stabilised, CO2 emission levels. IEA (2011) regards the atmospheric carbon dioxide level of
450 parts per million (ppm) as the threshold that is conform with the 2 ◦C target. The
current level of 390 ppm indicates that four-fifths of the permitted budget is already locked
9The past emission trajectory matches observed data, which is taken from www.cerina.org/home and
www.iwr.de/klima/ausstoss_welt.html. The computation of the future trajectories corresponds to the phys-
ically based equation (9) in Raupach et al. (2011), where the business-as-usual growth rate of emissions is
assumed to be 3 percent.
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in. Also accounting for the increasing energy demand that is triggered by global economic
and population growth, IEA (2011) projects the expansion of the high-carbon infrastructure
in the next five years will already mark the crossing of the 450ppm threshold. Fatih Birol,
chief economist at the IEA, warns: “The door is closing. I am very worried - if we don’t
change direction now on how we use energy, we will end up beyond what scientists tell us is
the minimum [for safety]. The door will be closed forever."10
Another strand of literature considers the stabilised level of radiative forcing of greenhouses
gases as an anchor for climate policy targets. While most of the mitigation scenarios in
the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report base on a level of 4.5 W/m2 in 2100, Meinshausen
et al. (2006) conclude that lower numbers would be required to keep a high probability to
achieve the 2◦C target. Different climate models show this to be a level of 2.6 W/m2 for the
"representative concentration pathways" (RCPs), see for example Moss et al. (2008) and Moss
et al. (2010). These RCPs are designed to update the SRES scenarios by explicitly accounting
for information on climate policies, land-use and other socio-economic developments.11 van
Vuuren et al. (2011b) show that the RCP2.6. is technically feasible. However, emissions need
to decrease significantly. Compared to the business as usual scenario, the required cumulative
emission reduction over the century is assessed to be 70 percent.
Undertaking enormous reductions in such a short time frame, requires a radical redesign of
the energy sector and industry. However, a swift switch to carbon-neutral alternatives will
pose a vast challenge to the global economy.
How should policy makers respond to such a small window of opportunity? The answer might
be less straightforward if the following reservations are considered. Firstly, the projections of
climate responses and the resulting damage to the economy and human health will probably
continue to involve substantial uncertainties for the next few years. Secondly, enormous
emission reductions imply large sunk costs, which may not recouped before long. Thirdly,
the worst effects of global warming and thus the benefits of a climate policy reducing them
may not be felt for decades, whereas the costs of tackling climate change will burden the
economies immediately. Hence, in spite of all warnings, policy makers are tempted to wait
instead of taking action.
Despite the apparent prominence of the limited time to act issue in the climate literature,
there has been very little effort to apply optimal climate policy under uncertainty to this
important time limit. It is for this reason that we present a non-perpetual real options model
that fits closely into the outlined facts.
10The statement is taken from http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/09/fossil-fuel-
infrastructure-climate-change?intcmp=122.
11For more details on RCPs see van Vuuren et al. (2011a).
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3 The Window-of-Opportunity Modelling Setup
This section anchors our modelling approach in the existing real options literature. Before we
begin our theoretical discussion, we believe it is helpful to characterize our use of real options
models. Recent research has documented that it is more than a guideline for decision makers.
More precisely, there is ample evidence that policy makers employ a “real options heuristic”
[Kogut & Kulatilaka (2001)], i.e. retain the upside potential without the downside risk of
fully committing up front. That means that in a situation of substantial uncertainties about
the benefits of a policy, decision makers keep the options to act alive. Afraid of committing
themselves to hugh expenses, they tend to wait for further information. However, as explained
in section 2 the option to limit global warming to 2◦C will expire at some time soon in the
future. The consequential question that arises is, whether and how this affects the policy
maker’s decision. By incorporating the opportunity to act explicitly, the following model is
set up to provide an answer.
To begin with the basis of the decision-making, it is in common economic practice to assume
that a forward looking social planner strives to find the optimal timing of a climate policy
by maximizing the flow of consumption over time.12 She faces the intergenerational trade-off
problem that investments into a mitigation strategy, which substantially reduces emissions,
force the current economy to abstain from consumption, but avoid climate damages that
would decrease future consumption potential. Moreover, bad timing will certainly lead to one
of the following two irreversibility effects. On the one hand, investing too early in mitigation
technologies could trigger enormous sunk costs that are not recouped for a long time. On
the other hand, waiting too long may cause irreversible damage to ecological systems that
are valuable to human health or the economy. However, ubiquitous uncertainties in almost
every component of projections and especially in the assessment of future climate damages
render a well-informed decision about the timing almost impossible. Put differently, all
plans depend decisively on the unknown sensitivity of losses to climate change. Hence,
particularly the uncertainties of the future climate damages and their effects are focussed on
in the following, whereas any other lack of knowledge is assumed to be resolved for the sake
of analytical tractability. Expressed mathematically, the policy maker solves the following
objective function, which consists of the expected net present value of future consumption
levels:
(1) W (X,∆T ) = E
[
(1− w(τ))
∫ ∞
t=0
L (Xt,∆Tt)Cte
−rtdt
]
,
where E[·] is the expectation operator and Ct is aggregate consumption over time with the
initial value normalised to 1. In its simplest form, the level of consumption is assumed to
12In this framework the world is treated as a single entity in the interest of simplicity. The world climate
policy equilibrium can be constructed as a symmetric Nash equilibrium in mitigation strategies. The equi-
librium can be determined by simply looking at the single country policy which is defined ignoring the other
countries’ abatement policy decisions [Leahy (1993)].
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be equivalent to the level of GDP. The pure rate of social time preference is expressed by r.
The climate damages are measured by L(Xt,∆Tt). This loss function is attached to the level
of consumption, where ∆Tt describes scientifically estimated changes in temperature and Xt
is a (positive) stochastic damage function parameter determining the sensitivity of losses to
global warming. If the policy maker takes measures to limit temperature increase to some
target τ , she is obliged to pay abatement costs that amount to a certain percentage w (τ) > 0
of the annual GDP. In the case of no climate policy, the abatement costs w (τ) are zero.
Instead of trying to model climate impacts in any detail, we keep the problem analytically
simple by assuming that damages depend only on temperature change, which is chosen as a
measure of climate change. To be precise, following Pindyck (2009a,b) we assume that the
damage from warming and the associated physical impacts of climate change as a fraction of
GDP is implied by the exponential loss function
(2) L (Xt,∆Tt) = e−Xt(∆Tt)
2
,
where 0 < L (Xt,∆Tt) ≤ 1, ∂L/∂ (∆Tt) ≤ 0 and ∂L/∂Xt ≤ 0. This yields GDP at time t
net of damage from warming in the order of L(Xt,∆Tt)GDPt, i.e. climate-induced damages
result in less GDP, and hence less consumption. Intuitively, a high value of Xt means that
damages are sharply curved in ∆Tt.
Before we turn to the modelling of the uncertainty that is attached to Xt in equation (2),
we briefly introduce the other component in the loss function: the temperature increase
∆Tt. For this we adopt the commonly used climate sensitivity function in Weitzman (2009a)
and Pindyck (2009a,b). The single linear differential equation compresses all involved com-
plex physical processes by capturing climate forcings and feedbacks in a simplified manner.13
Hence, a direct link between the atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration Gt and the tem-
perature increase ∆Tt is obtained by
(3) d∆Tt = m1
(
ln (Gt/Gp)
ln 2
−m2∆Tt
)
dt,
where Gp is the inherited pre-industrial baseline level of greenhouse gas, and m1 and m2 are
positive parameters. The first term in the bracket stands for the radiative forcing induced by
a doubling of the atmospheric greenhouse gases. The second term represents the net of all
negative and positive feedbacks. A positive parameter for this term thus rules out a runaway
greenhouse effect. The parameter m1 describes the thermal inertia or the effective capacity
to absorb heat by the earth system, which is exemplified by the oceanic heat uptake.
13Factors that influence the climate are categorised into forcings and feedbacks. A forcing is understood as
a primary effect that changes directly the balance of incoming and outgoing energy in the earth-atmosphere
system. Emissions of aerosols and greenhouse gases or changes in the solar radiation are examples. A
secondary and indirect effect is described by a feedback that boosts (positive feedback) or dampens (negative
feedback) a forcing. The blackbody radiation feedback exemplifies an important negative feedback, whereas,
for example, the ice-albedo feedback accelerates warming by decreasing the earth’s reflectivity.
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Let H define the considered time horizon. In the business as usual scenario, the maximal
temperture increase is assumed to double the warming after H years. This is tantamount
to ∆Tt → 2∆TH for t → ∞, which implies 2∆TH = 1/m2 as the equilibrium and m1m2
as the adjustment speed. The change in temperature increases linearly in the logarithm of
greenhouse gas concentrations and thus m1m2 = ln 2H . Cancelling terms and rearranging gives
(4) d∆Tt =
ln (2)
H
(2∆TH −∆Tt) dt,
and
(5) ∆Tt = 2∆TH
(
1− e− ln 2H t
)
,
if the initial value ∆T0 is set to zero. Equation (4) is an essential building block in the real
options modelling setup, while equation (5) is useful for integrating the intertemporal climate
change damage function.14
If the policy maker abates, a certain temperature target is assumed to be met after H years,
i.e. ∆TH ≤ τ . In this case equations (4) and (5) are reshaped to
(6) d∆Tt =
ln (2)
H
(2τ −∆Tt) dt,
and
∆Tt = 2τ
(
1− e− ln 2H t
)
,(7)
respectively.
Let us now focus on the other component in equation (2), which is the sensitivity of losses to
global warming. Due to the deep structural uncertainties in the natural sciences combined
with uncertainty about future economic damages and the economies’ ability to adapt to them,
conceptualising Xt as a deterministic variable would be far-fetched. We thus need to specify
a stochastic process Xt. Particularly for long timescales, uncertainty increases, because the
magnitude and sequence of feedbacks to the initial forcings are hardly predictable. Hence,
the process X = (Xt)t≥0 is commonly presumed to follow a geometrical Brownian motion
with (deterministic) drift parameter α and standard deviation σ,
(8) dXt = αXtdt+ σXtdBt,
where B is a standard Wiener process, see for example Pindyck (2000). The fluctuation of
Xt over time complicates considerably the decision whether to exercise the real options of
14The increase in temperature is generated by some unspecified natural science climate model. Ultimately,
we take ∆Tt and thus the geophysical microfoundation from climate models and impose this mathematically
upon our economic model. This allows us to bypass climate and atmospheric modelling.
8
adopting the climate policy. Equation (8) allows one to trace the uncertainty transmission
to optimal policies, as social welfare W thus evolves as
W (X,∆T ) = E
[
(1− w(τ))
∫ ∞
0
e−Xt(∆Tt)
2
e−(r−g0)tdt
]
∼= E
[
[(1− w(τ))
∫ ∞
0
(
1−Xt∆T 2t +
1
2
(
Xt∆T
2
t
)2)
e−(r−g0)tdt
]
,(9)
with a constant consumption/GDP growth rate of g0 and the assumption that r is greater
than expected consumption growth rate g0. Note that the exponential loss function of Xt
renders an explicit analytical solution of the Ito-integral impossible. Therefore we use 2nd-
order Taylor’s expansions approximations in the numerical analysis below.
We need to determine optimal climate policies which imply an either-or decision, i.e. the value
of action versus inaction is computed in the following. The welfare value of implementing the
environmental policy now, denoted by WA (X,∆T ; τ) ≡WAction (X,∆T ; τ), is computed by
equation (9) with w(τ) > 0 and the temperature equation (7). After utilizing the relationship
E [Xnt ] = X
n
0 e
(nα+ 12n(n−1)σ2)t, which is derived by means of Ito’s Lemma, the welfare for
taking action now evolves as
(10) WA (X,∆T ; τ) = (1− w (τ))
[
1
r − g0 − 4τ
2γ1X + 8τ
4γ2X
2
]
,
where
γ1 =
1
η1
− 2
η1 +
ln 2
H
+
1
η1 + 2
ln 2
H
,
γ2 =
1
η2
− 4
η2 +
ln 2
H
+
6
η2 + 2
ln 2
H
− 4
η2 + 3
ln 2
H
+
1
η2 + 4
ln 2
H
.
η1 = r − g0 − α
and
η2 = r − g0 −
(
2α+ σ2
)
.
Note that it is assumed that both η1 and η2 are positive.15
Alternatively, the policy maker may want to continue to emit CO2 emissions at the same
level and therefore ∆Tt becomes ∆TH at t = H, but no abatement costs are incurred, i.e.
w(τ) = 0. Applying the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman principle and Ito’s Lemma to equation
(9), we obtain the inaction value WN (X,∆T ; ∆TH) ≡ WNo Action (X,∆T ; ∆TH), which is
15Please see Appendix A for a derivation.
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given by the partial differential equation
(r − g0 − α)WN =
(
1−Xt∆T 2t +
1
2
(
Xt∆T
2
t
)2)
+
(
ln (2)
H
(2∆TH −∆Tt)
)
∂WN
∂∆T
+ αX
∂WN
∂X
+
1
2
σ2X2
∂2WN
∂X2
+
∂WN
∂t
.(11)
The solutions to WN (X,∆T ; ∆TH) consist of two components: a particular solution and
a general solution: WN (X,∆T ; ∆TH) = WNP (X,∆T ; ∆TH) + WNG (X,∆T ; ∆TH). Both
solutions have a straightforward economic meaning. The business as usual policy is valued
by the particular solution, which is derived by solving equation (9) with w(τ) = 0:
(12) WNP (X,∆T ; ∆TH) =
1
r − g0 − 4∆T
2
Hγ1X + 8∆T
4
Hγ2X
2,
where the parameters have the same forms as in equation (10).16 The value of the real options
is obtained from the homogenous part of equation (11) being
(r − g0 − α)WNG =
(
ln (2)
H
(2∆TH −∆Tt)
)
∂WNG
∂∆Tt
+ αX
∂WNG
∂X
+
1
2
σ2X2
∂2WNG
∂X2
+
∂WNG
∂t
.(13)
As discussed in section 2 the limited time to act implies the availability of real options in
equation (13) of only a few years’ time. This implies that at the end of t∗ years, 0 < t∗ < H,
the real options value approaches zero. This focus upon optimal policies over (0, t∗) reflects
the largely irreversible build-up of CO2 in the atmosphere and clearly deviates from the
infinite horizon assumption that is assumed in almost all variants of real options models.
Though it is not possible to exactly pin down how many years are left for the policy maker
to act before it is too late, we assume a fixed time of years left for the policy maker to pursue
aggressive moves to curb emissions. What is the optimal pace of action given this critical
window of opportunity?
It is the usual practice in financial derivatives that 2-factor partial differential equation (13)
can be solved by 2-dimensional finite difference methods. However, we can use the method
of separation of variables to reduce (13) into a one factor partial differential equation, as we
know that the non-perpetual real options are related to the diffusion process X. Without the
stochastic process in equation (9), the real options terms do not exist. On the contrary, the
policy maker considers the process ∆Tt as an exogenous variable in the business as usual
case. Furthermore, the particular solution in equation (12) implies that the solutions to
equation (13) consist of the mathematical product of two different components: one for Xt
and the other for ∆Tt. The discussion indicates that we can use the method of separation of
variables to solve and simplify equation (13). As shown in Appendix B, equation (13) can
16Please see Appendix A for a derivation.
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be transformed into the following one factor partial differential equation,
(14)
(
r − g0 − α+ 2ln (2)
H
)
WNG = αX
∂WNG
∂X
+
1
2
σ2X2
∂2WNG
∂X2
+
∂WNG
∂t
.
The main difference between (13) and (14) is the transition of the term(
ln(2)
H (2∆TH −∆Tt)
)
∂WNG
∂∆Tt
in equation (13) into the higher effective discount rate of equa-
tion (14), increased by a factor of 2 ln(2)H ∼= 1.39% for H =100. The meaning is straightfor-
ward, as higher changes in temperature in the future lead to an lower intertemporal value
of consumption and GDP. This is equivalent to lower real options values being caused by
higher effective discount rates. Equation (14) can be solved by numerical methods such as
one-factor/dimensional explicit finite difference methods.17
Matters are made difficult when incorporating limited time to act. So far, no closed-form
solutions are known for non-perpetual real options models, as in most of cases in financial
derivatives pricing.18 Therefore we seek a numerical solution instead. To this end, a simple
explicit finite difference scheme is employed. The finite difference solutions of the 1-factor
partial differential equation (14) may be obtained using iteration or matrix inversion tech-
niques.19 The value-matching condition for the optimal stopping problem for the policy
maker is represented by
(15) WA
(
X¯,∆T ; τ
)
= WNP
(
X¯,∆T ; ∆TH
)
+WNG
(
X¯,∆T ; ∆TH
)
,
where X¯ denotes the thresholds at which the policy-maker would take action by exercising
real options today, which obliges to pay the annual abatement costs w (τ) in percent of
GDP to limit the future temperature increase to less than τ at t = H.20 On the contrary,
exercising the real options implies that the policy maker forgoes the option to wait and act
later as more information about Xt becomes available. An algorithm for calculating equation
(14) is deduced in Appendix C.
We have now laid out an applicable analytical approach that directly addresses the issue of
the limited time to act. In the remainder of this paper we perform a series of calibrations of
this model.
17For a similar algorithm in derivative pricing, see Brennan & Schwartz (1978). Using 2-dimensional finite
difference methods would complicate the numerical analysis of the model without altering the basic message.
18See, for example, the standard textbooks Hull (2010) and Wilmott (1998).
19The first paper to recognize that option prices could be obtained with a finite difference solution to
the partial differential equation was Schwartz (1977). The finite difference method proceeds by replacing
differentials with differences and then solving over a grid of time and state variables subject to the boundary
conditions. A thorough review of the state of the art in numerical finite difference techniques along with an
exhaustive list of references is offered in Duffy (2006).
20The value-matching conditions involve the value function, while the smooth-pasting conditions concern
its first-order derivatives. The smooth-pasting boundary condition will be imposed numerically via the finite
difference method.
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4 Numerical Simulations and Results
Formal theory is essential in enabling us to organise our knowledge about climate problems in
a coherent and consistent way. However, the formal theory needs to be applied to data if it is
to enhance our understanding and have relevance for practical problems. This calibration ex-
ercise will provide new insights and may thus contribute to climate policy discussions, which
are certainly influenced by limited time to act. For this purpose we map the theoretical frame-
work presented above to real-world data. Where possible, parameter values are drawn from
empirical studies. However, the determination of some parameters is somewhat speculative
or they are drawn from back-of-the-envelope calculations.21 Therefore, for each parameter a
sensitivity analysis over a sufficiently wide grid is performed, while keeping an eye on robust-
ness. The unit time length corresponds to one year and annual rates are used when applicable.
Our base parameters are chosen to come close to reality, which means α = 0, σ = 0.075,
r = 0.025, g0 = 0.0, and H = 100. ∆TH is assumed to be 3.4◦C, which is equivalent to 4
degrees of warming since the pre-industrial level. τ is assumed to be 1.4◦C by assumption
which is equivalent to 2 degrees of warming compared with the pre-industrial level. In order
to assess the economic costs of mitigation, Edenhofer et al. (2010) have compared the energy-
environment-economy models MERGE, REMIND, POLES, TIMER and E3MG in a model
comparison exercise. In order to improve model comparability, the macroeconomic drivers
in the five modelling frameworks employed were harmonised to represent similar economic
developments. On the other hand, different views of technology diffusion and different struc-
tural assumptions regarding the underlying economic system across the models remained.
This helps to shed light on how different modelling assumptions translate into differences in
mitigation costs. Despite the different structures employed in the models, four of the five
models show a similar pattern in mitigation costs for achieving the first-best 400ppm CO2
concentration pathway. After allowing for endogenous technical change and carbon capture
and storage with a storage capacity of at least 120 GtC, the mitigation costs are estimated
to be approximately 2 percent of worldwide GDP. These costs turned out to be of a similar
order of magnitude across the models. We therefore assume that w(τ) = 0.02.
As the sensitivity of losses Xt fluctuates over time, we have to pay special attention to
the magnitude of the resulting climate damages. As an illustration and in order to gain an
intuition Figure 1 shows the numerically simulated loss equation (2) based on the temperature
equation (4) for three alternative X terms, which are assumed to be constant. The considered
time period ranges from t = 0 to t = 200. Two effects must be recognized. Firstly, the
minimum of L(Xt,∆Tt) and therefore the maximum of GDPt net of damages is obtained for
the lowest value of the drift term. Secondly, as can be easily seen in the graph, L spreads
out considerably during the time of undertaking no mitigation. For t = 50 years the damage
is 3.89 percent of GDP for constant Xt = 0.01, 3.12 percent of GDP for Xt = 0.008, and
21Despite the increasingly detailed understanding of climate processes from a large body of research, various
parameters involved remain inevitably unanswered except in retrospect.
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2.35 percent of GDP for Xt = 0.006. After t = 100 years the corresponding damage is 10.92
percent of GDP for Xt = 0.01, 8.83 percent of GDP for Xt = 0.008, and 6.70 percent of GDP
for Xt = 0.006.22
Figure 2: Simulated Loss Due To Global Warming in Percent of GDP
To simulate the full model, we have to solve equation (13) by utilizing the finite difference
method. To this end, it is transformed into a one-factor partial difference equation (see
Appendix B). The variable X and the parameter t need to be expressed as a network
mesh of discrete points, ∆X and ∆t. Afterwards, the partial differential equation can be
displayed as set of finite difference equations that are numerically solvable in a backward
scheme and subject to corresponding discrete-time boundary conditions (see Appendix C
for more details). We use the following benchmark values for the explicit finite difference
method: Xmax = 0.05, ∆t = 0.0001, ∆X = 0.0002 · σ.23
Results for various parameters are displayed in the Figures 3 - 6. The intuitive threshold plots
split the space spanned by X shocks into action and inaction areas. In the inaction area the
marginal reward for pursuing CO2 reductions is insufficient and policy makers prefer to wait.
The economic explanation of the thresholds X¯ is straightforward. The index X is part of the
loss function. The smaller X¯ is, the faster the policy response will be. For the sake of clarity,
Figure 3 offers an isolated inspection of the impact of alternative time horizons upon the
climate policy threshold for the baseline parameters. Broadly speaking, the results suggest
that limited time to act has a significant impact upon the threshold for t∗ < 5 years. In the
case of very small t∗, rational policy makers will pursue immediate precautionary measures
in the direction of low-carbon alternatives to prevent a long-term high carbon lock-in. In
other words, the results elevate the urgency of climate change policies.24
22These numbers are in the range of common assumptions in the literature. In Weitzman (2009b) the
damage costs are calibrated to be 9 (25) percent of GDP for 4◦C (5◦C) of warming and Millner et al. (2010)
consider damages of 6.5 percent of GDP for 5◦C of warming.
23The benchmark values of ∆t and ∆X are chosen to make sure positive coefficient of equation (B6) and
ensure convergence and stability for (B5) in Appendix C in an explicit finite difference method scheme.
24But a large caveat should accompany any use of that number because it assumes that the climate policies
will be both efficient and effective. Unfortunately, there is a voluminous literature of government failure,
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Figure 3: The Impact of Alternative Time Horizons t∗ Upon the X Threshold
This result of curbing emissions aggressively contrasts the slow, incremental approach to
CO2 mitigation in reality and fits the urgency emphasized by Krugman (2010). He warns
of relying on models that advocate delaying mitigation measures. For instance, the optimal
policy in Nordhaus’s cost-benefit model would stabilize the atmospheric carbon dioxide con-
centration at a level about twice its preindustrial average, which is supposed to lead to a
temperature of 3◦C. Decreasing emissions are not required before 2045. This strategy has
only modest negative effects on global welfare according to the RICE-model.25 However, the
crucial question arises, of how trustworthy such a projection really is. One the one hand,
consequences of such a warming are hardly predictable. On the other hand, looking back at
historic experiences does not reveal information, as for most of the time span of human civi-
lizations global climatic patterns have stayed within a very narrow range. Hence, it cannot
be taken for granted that such a policy will not cause a dangerous climate crisis. Despite its
stylised nature, the non-perpetual real option framework, however, allows one to incorporate
scientific findings such as the limited time frame and thus may deliver a road map for keeping
the planet safe.
How robust is this conclusion? In the following, this result is tested for its sensitivity to
alternative choices of the noisiness level σ in the sensitivity of losses, the predicted temper-
ature increase ∆TH and the discount rate r. In particular, the assessments of the climate
damage costs exhibit a broad range of uncertainty and always leads to controversies. Beyond
the issue of the likely consequences of warming, it is debatable how non-market goods like
human life and the intrinsic values of ecosystems are appropriately monetarised and how
catastrophes that have a low probability but high impacts are included. Furthermore, the
future capabilities for adapting to climate change are hardly predictable. By comparing 28
studies on marginal damages costs in different regions, Tol (2005) emphasises that the esti-
regulatory capture and the impact of rent-seeking behaviour within the policy process. Climate policy is
likely to be a large source of economic rents from policy interventions. Note that this is an exploratory paper,
and by no means intended to give blanket approval to any proposal for climate protection.
25Please see Nordhaus (2010) for more information.
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mates give insights into signs, orders of magnitude and patterns of vulnerability but remain
speculative. To study the effects of uncertainty in the assessments, Figure 4 illustrates the
results for different values of σ. It provides an important twist in the story by revealing
the adverse effects of uncertainty on the policy makers’ decision. The combination of limited
time to act and even moderate increases in uncertainty may make the rational policy response
weaker, not stronger. The reason is that the benefits of waiting for uncertainty to dissipate
overwhelm the cost of moving too slowly. Thus, rational policy makers will not necessarily
behave prudently to keep nature from passing the 2◦C threshold. Put differently, the high σ
- small t∗ constellation is a double-edged sword. For high σ the temptation to avoid tackling
climate change is hard to resist although a steep near-term reduction in emissions is needed
and a sound investment as indicated by climate science.
X threshold
Figure 4: The Impact of t∗ and σ Upon the X Threshold
Another substantial source of uncertainty is represented by the temperature increase ∆TH .
The IPCC’s first assessment, published back in 1990, predicted a warming of 3◦C by 2100,
with no confidence bands. The second IPCC assessment, in 1995, suggested a warming of
between 1◦C and 3.5◦C. The third, in 2001, widened the bands to project a warming of 1.4◦C
to 5.8◦C. The fourth assessment in 2007 restrained them again, from 1.8◦C to 4.0◦C. At the
moment it seems unlikely that scientific uncertainty will be completely resolved in the near
future. Quite the reverse, Kevin Trenberth (Head, National Center for Atmospheric Research
in Boulder, Colorado) recently warned in a commentary in Nature Online (21 January 2010)
headlined “More Knowledge, Less Certainty” that “the uncertainty in AR5’s predictions and
projections will be much greater than in previous IPCC reports.”26 The reason for this is that
“our knowledge of certain factors [responsible for global warming] does increase,” he wrote,
“so does our understanding of factors we previously did not account for or even recognize.”27
26See http://www.nature.com/climate/2010/1002/full/climate.2010.06.html.
27Up-to-date climate models are trying to come to grips with a range of factors ignored or only sketchily
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In other words, there is still tremendous and in some cases even increasing uncertainty in the
climate projections. Figure 5 outlines the joint impact of different temperature predictions
∆TH and the time left to act t∗ to prevent the temperature from overshooting the 2◦C target.
For any ∆TH the curve exhibits the same concave shape as in Figure 3. Hence, independently
of the magnitude of the predicted temperature, a rational policy makers will take mitigation
actions earlier for small t∗. However, the effect of varying ∆TH is enormous and has a greater
influence on the optimal policy threshold than the limited time to act. The policy threshold
X doubles in size when assuming ∆TH = 2.9◦C instead of ∆TH = 3.9◦C and it increases even
more when taking ∆TH = 2.4◦C instead of our base calibration ∆TH = 3.4◦C. Hence, the
decision about when to implement a climate policy is radically influenced by the projection of
the temperature increase. As in reality broad uncertainty ranges of the temperature dynamics
exist, this simulation highlights how policy makers face hugh problems in reaching a decision
in favour of a mitigation strategy.28 What is a reasonable estimation to base climate policy
decision on?
X threshold
t*
Figure 5: The Impact of ∆TH and t∗ Upon the X Threshold
Next we take a closer look at the impact of the discount rate r. To explore the sensitivity to
alternative discounting assumptions, we employ a range of 0.0 < r < 0.04. As expected, the
results in Figure 6 affirm the view that higher discount rates will bolster the reasons for taking
a “wait and see” attitude towards climate policy. This is due to the fact that for a larger value
of r the intertemporal damage is substantially smaller. In other words, a higher discounting
dealt with in the past. One troubling aspect is the role of clouds because nobody can work out exactly
whether warming will change them in a way that amplifies or moderates global warming. Another problem
in understanding clouds is the role of aerosols which dramatically influence the radiation properties of clouds.
It therefore comes at no surprise that the resulting error bands are extremely wide.
28This raises the question how much better we can expect medium run climate projections to get. Can we
reduce forecast errors? How much can uncertainty go down as models improve? Although climate models have
improved and societal needs push for more accurate decadal climate projections over the next 10-30 years,
decadal projections are still in its infancy and the hope for useful decadal projections is far from assured [see
Cane (2010)]
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factor will trigger a later adoption and a lower intensity of climate policy. This highlights the
importance of attaining a consensus on the discount rate before an appraisal on the optimal
timing of policy implementation can be achieved. Another important conclusion from Figure
6 is that the effects of a higher discount rate trumps the effects of the limited time to act.
One way to resolve this conclusion is to make it normative that future generations’ welfare
should figure just as highly as the welfare of the current generation.29
X threshold
Figure 6: The Impact of t∗ and r Upon the X Threshold
To sum up, we may conclude that the knowledge to have a limited time to act should
accelerate climate policy significantly, in particular if the window of opportunity closes very
soon. However, ubiquitous uncertainties in the projections of the temperature increase and
the future damage costs as well as the different opinions on the discount rate affect the
decision considerably. In particular, the uncertainties in the damage costs are shown to
have adverse effects. Despite the urgency to take action, this kind of uncertainty delays the
implementation of a climate policy.
5 Conclusions
Recent scientific studies by Meinshausen et al. (2009) and Rogelj et al. (2011) indicate that
global greenhouse gas emissions need to be substantially reduced in upcoming years, in order
to limit global warming to 2◦C. This motivated us to investigate the climate policy implica-
tions of a time-limited window of opportunity. To this end, we have developed a conceptual
29To put a positive spin on it, one can point out that the Ramsey equation rt = ρ+ξgt can be employed as the
rationale behind a low discount rate. rt represents the consumption discount rate, ρ the time preference rate,
ξ the coefficient of relative risk aversion in the CRRA specification, and gt describes the consumption growth
rate over (0, t∗). The interest rate is then contingent upon the expected future growth rate of consumption
and lower rates can be justified by making the argument that the resources needed to adapt to global warming
will reduce the return on capital and the steady state growth rate. See Stokey (1998) for a corresponding
endogenous growth model.
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non-perpetual real options framework. The lesson to be pointed out is that, although this is
a stylized representation of the real world, real options models provide a disciplined way of
thinking about climate and its interaction with policy. Not least, they allow thinking afresh
about the critical window of opportunity. Modelling of limited time to act is a compara-
tively uncharted area of climate research. In spite of its concrete climate policy relevance,
nobody has explored the optimal policy response through the lens of real options models yet.
Therefore this paper will not only be of interest to specialists in real options theory but also
to an audience of climate scientists and policy makers. A unifying message from our paper
could be stated as follows: Policy makers have to take steps to cut emissions now, so that
a radical, hasty and extremely costly shift towards carbon-neutral alternatives is not neces-
sarily required. Although a global shift in energy- and carbon-intense investment patterns is
required to prevent a long-term high carbon lock-in, the policy makers will probably not take
drastic action in the near future. As shown by this paper, ubiquitous uncertainties in the
projections of the temperature increase and the future damage costs as well as the different
opinions how to discount the future consumption flows affect the decision considerably. In
particular, the uncertainties in the damage costs are shown to have adverse effects. Despite
the urgency of taking action, this kind of uncertainty may lead to a range of inaction, where
the policy makers prefer to postpone emission reductions. Instead of saying “there is not
much time left” we unfortunately may have to note: “time runs out”. That, in a nutshell, is
the dilemma of climate change.
Appendices
A Derivation of Equation (10) and Equation (12)
By applying Ito’s Lemma to the logarithm of Xt in equation (8) we obtain ∀ t ≥ 0 :
Xt = X0e
(α− 1
2
σ2)t+σBt .(A.1)
After raising equation (A.1) to the power of n, the application of the expectation value yields
E[Xnt ] = X
n
0 e
n(α− 1
2
σ2)tE[enσBt ] = Xn0 e
(nα− 1
2
nσ2)te
1
2
n2σ2t = Xn0 e
(nα+ 12n(n−1)σ2)t.(A.2)
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This relationship is utilized to compute equation (9) for a climate policy:
WA (X,∆T ; τ)
(A.3)
= E
[
(1− w(τ))
∫ ∞
0
(
1−Xt∆T 2t +
1
2
(
Xt∆T
2
t
)2)
e−(r−g0)tdt
]
= E
[
(1− w(τ))
∫ ∞
0
(
1−Xt4τ2
(
1− e− ln 2H t
)2
+
1
2
X2t 16τ
4
(
1− e− ln 2H t
)4)
e−(r−g0)tdt
]
= (1− w(τ))
∫ ∞
0
(
1− 4E[Xt]τ2
(
1− e− ln 2H t
)2
+ 8E[X2t ]τ
4
(
1− e− ln 2H t
)4)
e−(r−g0)tdt
= (1− w(τ))
∫ ∞
0
(
1− 4X0eαtτ2
(
1− e− ln 2H t
)2
+ 8X20e
(2α+σ2)tτ4
(
1− e− ln 2H t
)4)
e−(r−g0)tdt.
The second equality holds as the conduct of a climate policy is assumed to put the temperature
equation (7) into effect. The third equality is obtained by applying Fubini’s theorem before
rearranging and taking advantage of the monotonicity of the expectation value and the last
equality holds due to equation (A.2). By expanding the terms(
1− e− ln 2H t
)2
= 1− 2e− ln 2H t + e−2 ln 2H t(A.4)
and (
1− e− ln 2H t
)4
= 1− 4e− ln 2H t + 6e−2 ln 2H t − 4e−3 ln 2H t + e− 4 ln 2H t,(A.5)
we obtain after integrating
WA (X,∆T ; τ) = (1− w (τ))
[
1
r − g0 − 4τ
2X0
(
1
η1
− 2
η1 +
ln 2
H
+
1
η1 + 2
ln 2
H
)
+8τ4X0
(
1
η2
− 4
η2 +
ln 2
H
+
6
η2 + 2
ln 2
H
− 4
η2 + 3
ln 2
H
+
1
η2 + 4
ln 2
H
)]
,(A.6)
where
η1 = r − g0 − α
and
η2 = r − g0 −
(
2α+ σ2
)
,
which is the same as equation (10).
Please note that the welfare value of the business as usual policyWNP evolves in an analogue
way. Hence, its solution is the same but with w(τ) = 0, which gives equation (12).
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B Derivation of Equation (14)
As the real options are mainly related to the diffusion process X and the process ∆T in the
case of inaction is external to the policy maker, we can naturally hint that the solution to
WNG has the form,
WNG = f (∆T )Y (X, t) .(B.1)
Substituting (B.1) back to equation (13) yields
(r − g0 − α) f (∆T )Y (X, t) = ln (2)
H
(2∆TH −∆T )Y (X, t) df (∆T )
d∆T
+ αXf (∆T )
∂Y (X, t)
∂X
+
1
2
σ2X2f (∆T )
∂2Y (X, t)
∂X2
+ f (∆T )
∂Y (X, t)
∂t
.(B.2)
Dividing both sides by f (∆T ), we get
(r − g0 − α)Y (X, t) =ln (2)
H
(2∆TH −∆T ) Y (X, t)
f (∆T )
df (∆T )
d∆T
+ αX
∂Y (X, t)
∂X
+
1
2
σ2X2
∂2Y (X, t)
∂X2
+
∂Y (X, t)
∂t
.(B.3)
To make partial differential equation (B.3) solvable by the separation of variables,
ln(2)
H (2∆TH −∆T ) 1f(∆T ) df(∆T )d∆T has to be a constant linear term. This implies that the
solutions of f (∆T ) take the form
f (∆T ) = (2∆TH −∆T )2(B.4)
and
ln (2)
H
(2∆TH −∆T ) Y (X, t)
f (∆T )
df (∆T )
d∆T
= −2ln (2)
H
Y (X, t) .(B.5)
Equation (B.5) ensures the separation of equations and yields the following new partial
differential equation for Y (X, t) by substituting (B.5) back to (B.3),(
r − g0 − α+ 2ln (2)
H
)
Y (X, t) = αX
∂Y (X, t)
∂X
+
1
2
σ2X2
∂2Y (X, t)
∂X2
+
∂Y (X, t)
∂t
.(B.6)
Therefore, we obtain the solution
WNG = (2∆TH −∆T )2 Y (X, t) ,(B.7)
where Y (X, t) follows equation (B.6). The results are similar to Chen et al. (2011) apart
from the fact that equation (B.6) has the term ∂Y /∂t due to the “limited time to act” real
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options. Equation (B.6) can be solved by numerical methods such as finite difference methods.
Combining equations (B.6) and (B.7), we then obtain the desired 1-factor partial differential
equation for non-perpetual real options,(
r − g0 − α+ 2ln (2)
H
)
WNG = αX
∂WNG
∂X
+
1
2
σ2X2
∂2WNG
∂X2
+
∂WNG
∂t
,(B.8)
which gives equation (14).
C Explicit Finite Difference Method Scheme for Equation (14)
For real options with maturity t∗, the boundary conditions are
WNG (t,Xt = 0,∆Tt) = 0(C.1)
and
lim
x→∞W
NG (t,Xt = x,∆Tt)
= max
[
lim
x→∞
(
WA (t,Xt = x,∆Tt; τ)−WNP (t,Xt = x,∆Tt; ∆TH)
)
, 0
]
,(C.2)
where WA (t,X,∆T ; τ) and WNP (t,X,∆T ; ∆TH) are from equations (10) and (12), respec-
tively. The terminal condition is
WNG (t = t∗, Xt∗ ,∆Tt∗) = 0,(C.3)
which is used as the starting points as the explicit finite difference method is backwards
computing from t = t∗ to t = 0. The condition of
WNG (t,Xt,∆Tt) = max
[
WA (t,Xt,∆Tt; τ)−WNP (t,Xt,∆Tt; ∆TH) , 0
]
(C.4)
is checked for every t since it is a free-boundary condition for real options in a sense that
real options can be exercised at any time. Accordingly, equation (14) for real options WNG
can be approximated by a function that is defined on a following two-dimensional grid,
i.e. WNG (i∆t, j∆X) ≡ vi,j . For the explicit approximation, the partial derivatives are
approximated by
∂WNG
∂X
=
vi+1,j+1 − vi+1,j−1
2∆X
,(C.5)
∂2WNG
∂X2
=
vi+1,j+1 + vi+1,j−1 − 2vi+1,j
∆X2
,(C.6)
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∂WNG
∂t
=
vi+1,j − vi,j
∆t
.(C.7)
Substituting the above equations back into equation (14) yields(
r − g0 − α+ 2ln (2)
H
)
vi,j =αj∆X
(
vi+1,j+1 − vi+1,j−1
2∆X
)
+
1
2
σ2j2∆X2
(
vi+1,j+1 + vi+1,j−1 − 2vi+1,j
∆X2
)
+
(
vi+1,j − vi,j
∆t
)
.(C.8)
Finally, rearranging and simplifying further allows us to obtain
vi,j = a
∗
jvi+1,j−1 + b
∗
jvi+1,j + c
∗
jvi+1,j+1,(C.9)
where
a∗j =
1
1 +
(
r − g0 − α+ 2 ln(2)H
)
∆t
(
−1
2
αj∆t+
1
2
σ2j2∆t
)
,(C.10)
b∗j =
1
1 +
(
r − g0 − α+ 2 ln(2)H
)
∆t
(
1− σ2j2∆t) ,(C.11)
c∗j =
1
1 +
(
r − g0 − α+ 2 ln(2)H
)
∆t
(
1
2
αj∆t+
1
2
σ2j2∆t
)
,(C.12)
Analogue to equation (A.3), WA (t,Xt,∆Tt; τ) and WNP (t,Xt,∆Tt; ∆TH) can be expressed
by the following equations,
WA (Xt,∆Tt; τ) = (1− w (τ))
∫ ∞
0
e−(r−g0)t×
(C.13)
E
[(
1− 4Xtτ2
(
1− e− ln 2H (t+j∆t)
)2
+
1
2
(
4Xtτ
2
(
1− e− ln 2H (t+j∆t)
)2)2)]
e−(r−g0)tdt
and
WNP (Xt,∆Tt; ∆TH) =
∫ ∞
0
e−(r−g0)t×(C.14)
E
[(
1− 4Xt∆T 2H
(
1− e− ln 2H (t+j∆t)
)2
+
1
2
(
4Xt∆T
2
H
(
1− e− ln 2H (t+j∆t)
)2)2)]
dt,
where the term (t+ j∆t) reflects the temperature at time = (t+ j∆t) when computing the
payoffs for real options. Solving equations (C.14) and (C.13) is very time-consuming since we
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need to compute the integrals at each time step backwards. Note that equation (5) shows the
early temperature increase is not great for small t. Furthermore, as we compute the values
of WNP (Xt,∆Tt; ∆TH) and WA (Xt,∆Tt; τ) backwards at each step of time from t = t∗ to
t = 0, (t+ j∆t) approaching (t = 0) at for the final values of real options, which means that
at t = 0, (C.14) and (C.13) become
WA (Xt,∆Tt; ∆TH) ∼= (1− w (τ))
[
1
r − g0 − 4∆τ
2γ1X + 8∆τ
4γ2X
2
]
,(C.15)
WNP (Xt,∆Tt; τ) ∼= 1
r − g0 − 4∆T
2
Hγ1X + 8∆T
4
Hγ2X
2,(C.16)
which are the same as in equations (10) and (12). Numerical testing shows that using (C.15)
and (C.16), time invariant results, for the time from t = T to t = 0 gives almost the same
numerical results as using (C.14) and (C.13). The threshold for X¯t at time t = 0 is then
obtained from the above algorithm by checking numerically the points where equation (15)
holds.
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